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INTRODUCTION
The responsibility to protect, from its recent nativity in the 2001 re-
port of the International Commission on Intervention and State
Sovereignty (ICISS),' is the latest round in an old debate pitting the prin-
ciple of nonintervention in the internal affairs of states against allowing
such intervention to prevent gross and systematic violations of human
rights. Advocates for the concept see it as an important new commitment
by the international community, injecting new meaning into the tragi-
cally threadbare promise to never again allow mass atrocities to occur
unchallenged. ICISS offered the concept of responsibility to protect as a
new way to confront these calamities that addressed the concerns of
some nations that humanitarian intervention was merely a license to in-
vade. This idea made its way in four short years from the 2001 ICISS
Report into the 2005 Summit Outcome Document (Summit Outcome),
unanimously adopted by the Sixtieth Session of the U.N. General As-
sembly.2 A frequently repeated phrase in the commentary on
responsibility to protect is that it is an "emerging norm," representing the
coalescence of a new international consensus around the duties and pow-
ers of the international community in confronting massive human rights
violations.' While many advocates and commentators have been cautious
on this subject, one interpretation is that, as an "emerging norm," re-
sponsibility to protect is somewhere on the path to becoming customary
international law. "[W]ith the weight behind it of a unanimous General
Assembly resolution at head of state and government level, the responsi-
bility to protect can already be properly described as a new international
norm: a new standard of behavior . . . for every state."
1. INT'L COMM'N ON INTERVENTION & STATE SOVEREIGNTY [ICISS], THE RESPONSI-
BILITY TO PROTECT 2.29 (2001) [hereinafter ICISS REPORT], available at
http://www.iciss.ca/pdf/Commission-Report.pdf.
2. 2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1, 138, U.N. Doc. AIRES/60/1 (Sep.
16, 2005) [hereinafter Summit Outcome]. The Summit Outcome document is a General As-
sembly resolution that outlines the conclusions of the 2005 World Summit.
3. See, e.g., High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, Rep., A More Se-
cure World: Our Shared Responsibility, i[n 201-202, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004)
[hereinafter A More Secure World]; ICISS REPORT, supra note 1, 1 1.11; Gareth Evans, From
Humanitarian Intervention to the Responsibility to Protect, 24 Wis. INT'L L.J. 703, 713
(2006); Ramesh Thakur & Thomas G. Weiss, R2P: From Idea to Norm-and Action?, 1
GLOBAL RESP. TO PROTECT 22, 38 (2009).
4. Gareth Evans, President Emeritus, Int'l Crisis Grp. and Co-Chair, Int'l Comm'n on
Intervention & State Sovereignty, Statement to United Nations General Assembly Informal
Interactive Dialogue on the Responsibility to Protect 4 (July 23, 2009) [hereinafter Evans
Comments], available at http://www.un.org/galpresident/63/interactive/protectlevans.pdf. Mr.
Evans, former foreign minister of Australia and co-chair of the ICISS, also stated: "I do not
argue that the responsibility to protect can be properly described at this stage as a new rule of
customary international law. That will depend on how comprehensively this new concept is
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Although "new international norm" suggests that responsibility to
protect is becoming customary international law, even champions of the
concept accept that it is not currently customary international law.' Cus-
tomary international law is created through action (state practice) and
statements showing repeated state practice being motivated by a sense of
legal obligation (opinio juris).' The opinio juris requirement, first articu-
lated in the nineteenth century, provides a means to distinguish repeated
actions that are merely traditional or social, and thus bear no legal
weight7 (for example, not charging diplomats for their parking viola-
tions), from those that create legally binding obligations. As codified by
the Statute of the International Court of Justice, customary law is "evi-
dence of a general practice accepted as law."9 The International Court of
Justice in its landmark North Sea Continental Shelf case on customary
international lawo has written that "[n]ot only must the acts concerned
amount to a settled practice, but they must also be such, or be carried out
in such a way, as to be evidence of a belief that this practice is rendered
obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it.""
The literature on customary international law is vast, and the demar-
cation between state practice and opinio juris and what should count as
either is difficult and controversial. The concept can be broadly divided
into traditional and modern approaches. The traditional approach is in-
ductive, finding custom from the repeated actions of states and then
testing those actions for the existence of opinio juris.12 The modern ap-
proach is deductive, more heavily driven by opinio juris, or what states
say the law is rather than what they do. 3 While gallant attempts have
implemented and applied in practice, as well as recognised in principle, in the years ahead."
Id.
5. E.g., id. at 4.
6. North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den.; F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 44
(Feb. 20); see also ANTHONY A. D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 74-75 (1971). This simplified description of the creation of customary law, labelling
practice as action and opinio juris as speech, is not universally held but is sufficient for these
purposes. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 102 cmt. b (1987) ("'Practice of states' . . . includes diplomatic acts and instructions
as well as public measures and other governmental acts and official statements of pol-
icy . . . ."); IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 6 (6th ed. 2003).
7. FRANgois GtNY, M9THODE D'INTERPRtTATION ET SOURCES EN DROIT PRIVE Po-
SITIF § 110 (1899), quoted in D'AMATO, supra note 6, at 48-49.
8. BROWNLIE, supra note 6, at 6.
9. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, 33
U.N.T.S. 993.
10. North Sea Continental Shelf, 1969 I.C.J. 8 1.
I1. Id. 77.
12. Anthea E. Roberts, Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary International
Law: A Reconciliation, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 757, 758 (2001).
13. Id. Human rights lawyers and advocates have been criticized for being too quick to
reach for custom in order to codify human rights principles into binding law, often relying
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been made to reconcile the differences between these camps,14 a sim-
pler proposition shared, to some degree, by both schools is that in both
cases norms-whether as customary law or as a more general socio-
logical phenomenon-require some level of agreement, or general
recognition, as to both their existence and their content." While this
16 **
agreement need not amount to unanimity, it must not "disclose so
much uncertainty and contradiction,. so much fluctuation and discrep-
ancy ... that it is not possible to discern . .. any constant and uniform
usage, accepted as law." 7
extensively on opinio juris and ignoring practice. Bruno Simma & Philip Alston, The Sources
of Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus Cogens, and General Principles, 12 AUSTL. Y.B. INT'L L.
82, 83 (1992). As states tend not to broadcast their violations of human rights instruments and
espouse them in public, this "modem" approach to customary law allows the incorporation of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights into binding international law without the support
of state practice. The danger of this approach is that it weakens the very authority of custom-
ary law, since the "law" in this case is being routinely broken. This highlights the slippery and
difficult nature of customary law; repeated practice may result in a binding legal obligation,
but it may be difficult to determine where violations of that obligation simply amount to indi-
vidual violations or, perhaps, the "seeds" of a new customary norm. See D'AMATO, supra note
6, at 97-98.
14. See, e.g., Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., Custom on a Sliding Scale, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 146,
149 (1987). Kirgis notes
[o]n the sliding scale, very frequent, consistent state practice establishes a custom-
ary rule without much (or any) affirmative showing of an opinio juris, so long as it
is not negated by evidence of non-normative intent. As the frequency and consis-
tency of the practice decline in any series of cases, a strong showing of opiniojuris
is required. At the other end of the scale, a clearly demonstrated opinio juris estab-
lishes a customary rule without much (or any) affirmative showing that
governments are consistently behaving in accordance with the asserted rule.
Id. Anthea Roberts attempts to negotiate a path between the "traditional" and "modern" ap-
proaches to customary law by applying Ronald Dworkin's interpretive approach to law.
Roberts, supra note 12, at 774. Dworkin's theory maps well onto practice or opinio juris con-
siderations, as he incorporated both a backward-looking descriptive element (how well does
the rule reflect past practice) and a forward-looking normative element (what the rule should
be). Id. at 775. State practice is descriptive and opinio juris is normative-the challenge is
correctly balancing these two considerations. "In hard cases, there will be inconsistent levels
of state practice or opinio juris, which can give rise to multiple eligible interpretations." Id. at
772. Opinio juris can help inform what state practice should be counted (the long standing
practice of giving foreign aid should not create a legally binding obligation). Id.
15. Thus, in the Fisheries case, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) refused to accept
a particular rule regarding the extent of Norway's territorial waters since "other States have
adopted a different limit." Fisheries (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 116, 131 (Dec. 18).
16. JAMES L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONs 61 (Sir Humphrey Waldock ed., 6th ed.
1963).
17. Asylum Case (Colom. v. Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 265, 277 (Nov. 20). The court stated:
The facts brought to the knowledge of the Court disclose so much uncertainty and
contradiction, so much fluctuation and discrepancy in the exercise of diplomatic
asylum and in the official views expressed on various occasions, there has been so
much inconsistency in the rapid succession of conventions on asylum, ratified by
some States and rejected by others, and the practice has been so much influenced
768 [Vol. 32:765
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The responsibility to protect doctrine has been debated twice in the
past five years in the General Assembly: once during the lead up to the
2005 World Summit, and again in July 2009. Examining the statements
of U.N. member states' representatives will shed light on both the accep-
tance and the content of the doctrine. The 2005 World Summit debates
were structured on the U.N. Secretariat's In Larger Freedom report' and
produced the 2005 World Summit Outcome,'9 which incorporated the
responsibility to protect, although in a somewhat altered form from the
proposed doctrine. The 2009 debate was a direct response to a report
produced by the Secretariat 20 that attempted to take the two brief para-
graphs of the Summit Outcome dealing with responsibility to protect and
translate it into U.N. policy. Based on this record and the text of the 2005
World Summit Outcome, it is widely expected that the international
community must respond to mass atrocity crimes.2' But while the claim
that genocide is an unacceptable evil is an almost trivially easy norma-
tive statement, the road from there to a workable legal doctrine is
cluttered with political landmines. In the instances where there appears
to be an agreement on the existence of responsibility to protect, the dis-
cussion on what the doctrine allows or requires is more difficult.
This Note will first briefly review the history of responsibility to
protect from the late 1990s, analyzing the concept in the context of the
debate about humanitarian intervention. The content of the responsibility
to protect doctrine has been interpreted, like humanitarian intervention,
to allow greater leeway to an outside actor to intervene in the affairs of a
state by reducing the political costs for violating the norm of
by considerations of political expediency in the various cases, that it is not possible
to discern in all this any constant and uniform usage, accepted as law, with regard to
the alleged rule of unilateral and definitive qualification of the offence.
Id.
18. U.N. Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and
Human Rights for All: Rep. of the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/59/2005 (Mar. 21, 2005)
[hereinafter In Larger Freedom].
19. Summit Outcome, supra note 2.
20. U.N. Secretary-General, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: Rep. of the
Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/63/677 (Jan. 12, 2009) [hereinafter Secretary-General's Re-
port], available at http://globalr2p.org/pdf/SGR2PEng.pdf.
21. For example, the Egyptian representative noted that the states in the Non-Aligned
Movement, whose summit Egypt had just hosted,
expressed grave concern at instances wherein the Security Council fails to address
cases involving genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes.... [I]n such in-
stances where the Security Council has not fulfilled its primary responsibility for
the maintenance of international peace and security, the General Assembly should
take appropriate measures in accordance with the Charter to address the issue.
U.N. GAOR, 63d Sess., 97th plen. mtg. at 6, U.N. Doc. A/63/PV.97 (July 23, 2009).
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nonintervention." Similarly, the doctrine may also be prescriptive to the
extent to which, through the language of responsibility, it places an af-
firmative duty on outside actors to act in cases of massive human rights
* 23
violations.
Through the record of General Assembly floor statements, this Note
will attempt to answer three questions: (1) Is a norm "emerging"? (2) Is
there a consensus understanding of what responsibility to protect means?
And (3) if the first two questions can be answered affirmatively, has this
created new rights or imposed new duties on states, either individually or
collectively? While evidence of an increasing international consensus
about third party legal and policy responses to mass atrocity crimes is
not sufficient to create legally binding customary law, it is necessary.
I. RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT FROM ICISS
TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
A. Ghosts of Humanitarian Intervention
The responsibility to protect debate echoes the earlier debate on hu-
manitarian intervention, a doctrine that would allow states to legally
enforce human rights through force. The central point of controversy is
essentially the same. Humanitarian intervention offered an exception to
the ban on the use or threat of force in Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter.
Article 2(4) states: "All Members shall refrain in their international rela-
tions from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent
with the Purposes of the United Nations." This fundamental principle of
the post-World War II international legal order is subject to two excep-
tions found in the U.N. Charter: the self-defense provisions of Article 51
and the enforcement power of the Security Council under Chapter VII.
Article 2(7) states that "[n]othing contained in the present Charter shall
authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essen-
tially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state . . .. [T]his principle
shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chap-
ter VII." Thus, between Articles 2(4) and 2(7) there exists a powerful
24defense of the "Westphalian sovereignty" of states. However, using this
22. Alex J. Bellamy, Whither the Responsibility to Protect? Humanitarian Intervention
and the 2005 World Summit, 20 ETHICS & INT'L AFF. 143, 145 (2006) (introducing a formal
structure composed of permissive and prescriptive axes, terms attributed to Luke Glanville).
23. Id.
24. Stephen Krasner defines Westphalian (or Westphalian/Vattelian) sovereignty as
noninterference in the internal affairs of other states, and each state can "determine its own
institutions of government." Stephen D. Krasner, The Hole in the Whole: Sovereignty, Shared
770 [Vol. 32:765
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absolute sovereignty as a means to shield states from scrutiny of human
rights violations raises moral concerns and questions about the very le-
gitimacy of that sovereignty.25 As one commentator observed:
Sovereignty; it is the reciprocal protection of torturers. And yet,
for decades, the discourse of international law courts repeated
that the principle of non-intervention constituted the foundation
of all global equilibrium. Professors of law, chancelleries and in-
ternational organizations celebrated the cult of absolute
sovereignty, which could only be limited by international ac-
cords as precarious as the good faith of those who signed them.26
Within this absolutist perspective, humanitarian intervention doctrine
was built to protect the human rights principles found in international
law.
Among the principles or "purposes of the United Nations" are "pro-
moting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental
freedoms." 27 Member states must promote "universal respect for, and
observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without
distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion."28 They must also
"pledge themselves to joint and separate action" to achieve these goals.29
This creates a potential conflict between the human rights protecting
purposes of the United Nations and the maintenance of peace and stabil-
ity through noninterference-a conflict between justice and peace. Thus,
humanitarian intervention was a mechanism to protect human rights
where their violation might be shielded from scrutiny by a state invoking
Articles 2(4) or 2(7), positing an additional exception to Article 2(4) to
allow intervention in order to prevent gross violations of human rights.30
Other scholars have examined whether a "right" of humanitarian in-
tervention has emerged as customary international law and to that end,
Sovereignty, and International Law, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1075, 1077 (2004). Sovereignty
generally involves various degrees of authority and control, and Westphalian sovereignty in-
volves authority over a particular territory. Id.
25. See MARIO BETTATI, LE DROIT D'INGtRENCE 17 (Gdrard Jorland ed., 1996).
26. Id. (translated from the original French by the author). This argument among
French academics was sparked by Bernard Kouchner and Professor Bettati with their book,
MARIO BETTATI & BERNARD KOUCHNER, LE DEVOIR D'INGtRENCE (Denoel 1987). Kouchner,
when he was the foreign minister of France from 2007 to 2010, pushed an expansive view of
responsibility to protect.
27. U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 3.
28. Id. art. 55.
29. Id. art. 56.
30. See Sean D. Murphy, Criminalizing Humanitarian Intervention, 41 CASE W. REs. J.
INT'L L. 341, 341 (2009) (noting that while many states do not view humanitarian intervention
as a justified use of force, "[s]ome states and scholars, however, see international law as per-
mitting such intervention").
Summer 201l] 771
Michigan Journal of International Law
they have evaluated state practice conducted with a subjective belief in
the existence of a legal right or obligation.3 ' Franck and Rodley, in their
study of forcible humanitarian intervention, reviewed the history of
"humanitarian" justifications for intervention, pointing out a long pattern
of abuse by Western colonial powers in the nineteenth and early twenti-
eth centuries, and by both sides during the Cold War.32 This abuse of
humanitarian intervention as justification for essentially colonialist en-
terprises would reverberate in the recent General Assembly debates."
One commentator noted during the debates on the responsibility to pro-
tect: "Let us be very wary of developing any doctrine for humanitarian
intervention. Any principle of intervention can readily be abused ... or
become a charter for imperial occupation."34 Franck and Rodley con-
clude that their case studies do "not constitute the basis for a definable,
workable, or desirable new rule of law which ... would make certain
kinds of unilateral military interventions permissible.""
The NATO bombing of Serbia during the Kosovo crisis was con-
ducted without Security Council authorization and again raised the
controversy over "unilateral" or "unauthorized" humanitarian interven-
tion. There was a heated debate over whether NATO essentially got away
with an international law violation even when the action was partially
legitimized after-the-fact by the Security Council's subsequent authori-
zation of a NATO-led peace keeping force." Antonio Cassese suggested
from these events that there may be an emerging norm allowing for uni-
lateral intervention under narrow circumstances in cases of humanitarian
crisis." Following in the analytical path of Franck and Rodley, Cassese
based this analysis on what he identified as emerging trends regarding
humanitarian intervention, which included the actions of the Organiza-
tion of African Unity (now the African Union) in Liberia and the actions
of the United States and United Kingdom to protect Kurds in northern
Iraq and Shiites in the south. 8 Professor (now Judge) Bruno Simma re-
31. Thomas M. Franck & Nigel S. Rodley, After Bangladesh: The Law of Humanitar-
ian Intervention by Military Force, 67 AM. J. INT'L L. 275, 276 (1973).
32. Id. at 284.
33. See infra notes 151-152 and accompanying text.
34. Alex de Waal, No Such Thing as Humanitarian Intervention: Why We Need to Re-
think How to Realize the "Responsibility to Protect" in Wartime, HARV. INT'L REV. (Mar. 21,
2007), http://hir.harvard.edu/no-such-thing-as-humanitarian-intervention?page-0, 3 .
35. Franck & Rodley, supra note 31, at 276. Their conclusion was based on the finding
that state practice overwhelmingly tended towards nonintervention in cases of humanitarian
crisis, as well as on the restrictions on intervention in the U.N. Charter. Id. at 302-03.
36. S.C. Res. 1244, 1 7, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244 (June 10, 1999).
37. Antonio Cassese, Ex iniuria ius oritur: Are We Moving Towards International Le-
gitimation of Forcible Humanitarian Countermeasures in the World Community?, 10 EUR. J.
INT'L L. 23, 26 (1999).
38. Id.
IVol. 32:765772
Status of the Responsibility to Protect
sisted this position by arguing that "offensive self-help by threats or use
of armed force without a basis in Chapter VII has been outlawed by the
jus cogens of the [U.N.] Charter." NATO did not have Security Council
authorization to bomb Serbia, and thus under Chapter VII, could not le-
gally intervene." NATO's legal position was particularly tenuous in that it
was executing an enforcement action against a nonmember that did not
attack a NATO member-making an Article 51 collective self-defense
claim impossible.4'
After the NATO air war against Serbia, the membership of the Non-
Aligned Movement (NAM)42 issued a statement at Cartagena, Colombia,
that "reject[ed] the so-called 'right' of humanitarian intervention, which
has no legal basis in the UN Charter or in the general principles of inter-
national law" 43 and included the "firm condemnation of all unilateral
military actions including those made without proper authorization from
the United Nations Security Council."" Similar language would later be
deployed against responsibility to protect.45
B. The International Commission on Intervention
and State Sovereignty
The responsibility to protect doctrine was very much the child of the
humanitarian intervention debate. After the controversy of the NATO
bombing of Serbia, then Secretary-General Kofi Annan challenged the
international community to determine what the approach should be to
the next humanitarian crisis, stating "if humanitarian intervention is, in-
deed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to
a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica-to gross and systematic violations of human
rights that affect every precept of our common humanity?" 46 The Cana-
dian government responded, establishing the International Commission
39. Bruno Simma, NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects, 10 EUR. J.
INT'L L. 1, 4 (1999).
40. Id. at 10.
41. Id.
42. The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) is a group of 115 mostly developing states. The
organization was formed to both support post-colonial states as well as resist being pulled into
the orbit of the United States or Soviet Union during the Cold War. See The Non-Aligned Move-
ment: Description and History, NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT [NAM],
http://www.nam.gov.za/background/history.htm (last updated Sept. 21, 2001).
43. NAM, XIII Ministerial Conference, Apr. 8-9, 2000, Cartagena, Colom., Final Doc-
ument, 263 [hereinafter Cartagena Statement], available at http://www.nam.gov.zal
xiiiminconf/minconf.pdf.
44. Id. I 11.
45. See infra Part II.
46. U.N. Secretary-General, We the Peoples: The Role of the United Nations in the
Twenty-First Century: Rep. of the Secretary-General, 217, U.N. Doc. A/54/2000 (Mar. 27,
2000.
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on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), which produced a report
titled The Responsibility to Protect,47 coining the term in the process.
ICISS took pains at the outset to distance itself from humanitarian in-
tervention. As Thomas Weiss, the Research Director for ICISS, has
written, ICISS wanted to "drive a stake through the heart of the term 'hu-
manitarian intervention."' 48 The report begins by noting "'[h]umanitarian
intervention' has been controversial both when it happens, and when it has
failed to happen" and goes on to discuss the troubled history of its applica-
tion, or nonapplication, in Rwanda, Kosovo, Bosnia, and Somalia. 49 The
chapter ends with an explicit decision to jettison the language of humani-
tarian intervention in favor of a redefinition of sovereignty that includes
responsibility to one's own population.so The central premise is that the
Westphalian conception of state sovereignty as unhindered control over a
particular territory by an internationally recognized government should
give way to a conception of sovereignty as a bundle of both rights and
duties. The duty to protect one's own population from egregious human
rights violations accompanies the right to noninterference from other
states.' If a state fails in its protective responsibility, this responsibility
shifts to the international community,5 2 opening the door for possible
intervention and thus a loss of Article 2(7) protections. The ICISS panel
saw this effort as documenting an ongoing process:
Rather than create a new norm, ICISS registered and dramatized
a norm shift already underway and found language to make it
more palatable to nay-sayers ... . [B]ased on state practice,
Council precedents, established and emerging norms, and evolv-
ing customary international law, the International Commission
47. ICISS REPORT, supra note 1, at vii.
48. Thomas G. Weiss, To Intervene or Not to Intervene? A Contemporary Snap-Shot, 9
CAN. FOREIGN POt'Y 141, 145 (2002).
49. ICISS REPORT, supra note 1, 1.1-4.
50. Id. H 8.31-32.
51. See id. 12.15.
52. There is a parallel here with the "surrogate protection" theory of international refu-
gee law. Cf Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. I(A)(2), July 28, 1951, 189
U.N.T.S. 150. Under this theory, the Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees
established an international obligation to provide substitute, or surrogate, protection to those
persons who have lost the protection of their home country, suffered persecution on one of the
enumerated grounds articulated by the Convention, and had fled abroad as a result of this
persecution. Thus, responsibility to protect might be a more active complement to surrogate
protection in that when faced with grievous abuse by a state (which would certainly give rise
to refugee protection), the international community can directly intervene in the affairs of that
state.
53. ICISS REPORT, supra note 1, 2.31. Article 2(7) of the U.N. Charter restricts U.N.
intervention in matters "essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state." U.N. Charter
art. 2, para. 7.
774 [Vol. 32:765
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on Intervention and State Sovereignty held that the proscription
against intervention is not absolute.54
Indeed, this idea is not new. There is ancient precedent for the idea
that sovereignty confers certain responsibilities on the sovereign, and
that the legal protection of sovereignty encompasses some normative
utility in furthering justice and stability. The idea of sovereignty as an
instrument for the protection of the life and safety of subjects is at least
as old as Hugo Grotius," who made "the first authoritative statement of
the principle of humanitarian intervention-the principle that exclusive-
ness of domestic jurisdiction stops when outrage upon humanity
begins." 6 Even within the Hobbesian concept of absolute internal sover-
eignty, the very purpose of the leviathan was to provide for "Peace and
the Common Defence" 7 and to enforce the "Lawes of Nature (as Justice,
Equity, Modesty, Mercy, and (in summe) doing to others, as wee would
be done to).""
The ICISS framework combines a rather tentative legal doctrine ad-
dressing the rights and duties of the international community, with a
policy proposal, recommending the allocation of funds towards devel-
opment assistance or peace-building efforts. 9 The doctrine encompasses
three tenets: the international community bears a responsibility to pre-
vent by addressing the root causes of a conflict before they boil over into
a full-fledged crisis;W a responsibility to react by responding with appro-
priate action, including coercive measures;6' and a responsibility to
rebuild in the aftermath of a crisis. 62 This three-part scheme represents a
graduated approach to protection-through the responsibility to prevent
and react, ICISS establishes a prescriptive responsibility for intervention
at the earlier stages of a crisis through a broad range of means, including
coercive measures such as sanctions, international criminal prosecution,
54. Thakur & Weiss, supra note 3, at 26, 53. Thakur and Weiss were both involved in
ICISS; Thakur as an ICISS commissioner, and Weiss as the research director for the ICISS
Report.
55. See HUGO GROTIUs, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS bk. H, ch. XXV (1625).
56. Hirsch Lauterpacht, The Grotian Tradition in International Law, 23 BRIT. Y.B.
INT'L L. 1, 46 (1946) (citing HuGo GRoIus, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIs bk. II, ch. XXV, § viii
(1625)). But see Theodor Meron, Editorial Comment, Common Rights of Mankind in Gentili,
Grotius and Suarez, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 110, 110 (1991) ("[Slome other principal works on
international law ... reveal that the concept of community interests, and the modern right of
humanitarian intervention it spawned, is pre-Grotian . . . .").
57. THOMAS HOBBEs, LEVIATHAN 228 (Crawford B. Macpherson ed., Penguin Books
1985) (1651).
58. Id. at 223.
59. ICISS REPORT, supra note 1, IT 5.1-2.
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and, ultimately, military intervention. In order to warrant military inter-
vention, the crisis must meet a "just cause" threshold, which includes
large-scale loss of life, ethnic cleansing, or both.6 ' Thus, military inter-
vention should be employed to halt only the most egregious violations
and conflicts.6
C. From ICISS to the General Assembly
The U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 again threw the conversation
on the legality of unauthorized intervention into turmoil. In response,
Kofi Annan convened the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and
Change (High-level Panel), which produced its own report, A More Se-
cure World: Our Shared Responsibility.65 This report represented a
significant shift in thinking about international law, and while it in many
ways echoed the ICISS Report, it was more remarkable in that it came
out of the U.N. system itself. Professor Anne-Marie Slaughter hailed A
More Secure World as "an extraordinary document, one that opens the
door to rethinking not only the United Nations but also some fundamen-
tal assumptions of the international legal system for the twenty-first
century."66
The report urged the Security Council to adopt the "emerging norm"
that there existed a responsibility to protect in cases of "genocide and
other large-scale killing, ethnic cleansing or serious violations of hu-
manitarian law."a6 The report stated that, in the case of intervention, the
Security Council should consider five factors:
1. The seriousness of the threat: is the threatened harm suffi-
ciently clear and serious to justify, prima facie, the use of
military force?
2. Proper purpose: is the primary purpose of the proposed action
to halt or avert the threat?
3. Last resort: have non-military options been exhausted?
4. Proportional means: is the response the minimum necessary?
63. Id. 14.19.
64. Id. 14.10.
65. A More Secure World, supra note 3, at 1.
66. Anne-Marie Slaughter, Comment, Security Solidarity, and Sovereignty: The Grand
Themes of UN Reform, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 619, 620 (2005).
67. A More Secure World, supra note 3, at 57, 203.
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5. Balance of consequences: is the response likely to succeed,
and are the consequences not likely to outweigh the threat?68
The panel also specified that any coercive action should occur through
the Security Council, under the auspices of its Chapter VII powers, thus
restricting the powers granted to individual states.69
This story took one more turn before it came to its conclusion during
the 2005 World Summit, when Secretary-General Annan distributed a
report that would serve as the basis of discussion for the World Summit.
This report, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and
Human Rights for All, touched on a wide range of issues from the Mil-
lennium Development Goals, to environmental sustainability, to Security
Council reform.70 Indeed, while Security Council reform was arguably
the most contentious and highest-priority issue raised for discussion,
responsibility to protect, as advocated in A More Secure World, was en-
dorsed in the report. In Larger Freedom took a more sensitive approach
to the controversies inherent in that debate regarding fears by some
states of impositions on their sovereignty, placing the collective action
imperative alongside development.72 However, via In Larger Freedom,
the original ICISS concept of responsibility to protect was transmitted
relatively unaltered to the General Assembly for debate.
68. Id. at 58, 207. These requirements in general, and the balance-of-consequences
requirement in particular, seem to strike a balance between "peace" and "justice" in favor of
peace, recognizing that it is better to not intervene if an intervention is more likely to cause
instability in the long run.
69. Id. at 57, 1 202-203; see also U.N. Charter arts. 39-51 (naming the Security
Council in each of these articles as the main body dealing with threats to the peace).
70. See In Larger Freedom, supra note 18, IT 9, 169.
71. Id. 135.
72. Carsten Stahn, Comment, Responsibility to Protect: Political Rhetoric or Emerging
Legal Norm?, 101 AM. J. INT'L L. 99, 107 (2007).
73. In Larger Freedom endorses the ICISS Report and responsibility to protect, describ-
ing the doctrine thus:
This responsibility lies, first and foremost, with each individual State, whose pri-
mary raison d'8tre and duty is to protect its population. But if national authorities
are unable or unwilling to protect their citizens, then the responsibility shifts to the
international community to use diplomatic, humanitarian and other methods to help
protect the human rights and well-being of civilian populations. When such meth-
ods appear insufficient, the Security Council may out of necessity decide to take
action under the Charter of the United Nations, including enforcement action, if so
required. In this case, as in others, it should follow the principles set out in section
III above.
In Larger Freedom, supra note 18, 135.
777Summer 2011]
Michigan Journal of International Law
II. THE U.N. DOCUMENTS ON RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT
A. The World Summit Outcome
Working from the recommendations presented by In Larger Free-
dom, the General Assembly debated responsibility to protect alongside a
wide range of other issues, and the doctrine was written into the 2005
World Summit Outcome document in two paragraphs, 138 and 139.74
Given the failure to address many of the high priority issues during the
Summit, the incorporation of responsibility to protect was arguably the
Summit's most important achievement. Paragraph 138 states that "[e]ach
individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity....
The international community should, as appropriate, encourage and help
States exercise this responsibility." 5 Paragraph 139 states "[t]he interna-
tional community, through the United Nations, also has the
responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other
peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter,
to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing
and crimes against humanity."" The Summit Outcome also pledges:
74. Summit Outcome, supra note 2, 138-139:
138. Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This responsi-
bility entails the prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, through
appropriate and necessary means. We accept that responsibility and will act in ac-
cordance with it. The international community should, as appropriate, encourage
and help States to exercise this responsibility and support the United Nations in es-
tablishing an early warning capability.
139. The international community, through the United Nations, also has the respon-
sibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in
accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help to protect populations
from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In this
context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner,
through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter
VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations
as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities are
manifestly failing to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic
cleansing and crimes against humanity. We stress the need for the General Assem-
bly to continue consideration of the responsibility to protect populations from
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and its impli-
cations, bearing in mind the principles of the Charter and international law. We also
intend to commit ourselves, as necessary and appropriate, to helping States build
capacity to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing
and crimes against humanity and to assisting those which are under stress before




Status of the Responsibility to Protect
In this context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a
timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in
accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-
by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organi-
zations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate
and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and
crimes against humanity."
This reflects previous iterations of the concept, in particular the first
two parts of the three-part responsibility articulated in the ICISS Re-
port-the responsibility to prevent and the responsibility to react.7 ' The
Summit Outcome language of "helping States build capacity to protect
their populations . . . and . . . assisting those which are under stress be-
fore crises and conflicts break out"" has some overlap with the ICISS
responsibility to prevent, although with less emphasis on coercive dip-
lomatic and economic measures." The responsibility to react or "take
collective action"" will be "in a timely and decisive manner," but only
when "peaceful means are inadequate and national authorities are mani-
festly failing to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes,
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity."8 2 This commitment is
qualified by a "case-by-case" determination, which seems to explicitly
reject the prescriptive proposals of the ICISS Report.83 The Summit Out-
come, however, does not address ICISS's "responsibility to rebuild."
One critical compromise that made the Summit Outcome language
palatable was that, unlike any of the supporting documents that led up to
it, paragraphs 138 and 139 explicitly predicated the responsibility to pro-
tect on four enumerated crimes: genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing,
and crimes against humanity.84 Jean Ping, President of the General As-
sembly during the negotiations, said that the idea for limiting
responsibility to protect to the four crimes came from the representative
77. Id.
78. Stahn, supra note 72, at 108-09.
79. Summit Outcome, supra note 2, 139 (closely tracking the ICISS Report).
80. The ICISS Report states that "support may take many forms. It may come in the
form of development assistance and other efforts to help address the root cause of potential
conflict." ICISS REPORT, supra note 1, at 19. However, chapter 3 of the ICISS Report other-
wise focuses largely on early warning systems, coordinated responses, and means of applying
diplomatic and economic sanctions on states. See id. at 19-27.
81. Summit Outcome, supra note 2, 1 139.
82. Id.
83. Stahn, supra note 72, at 109.
84. Summit Outcome, supra note 2, 139.
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of Pakistan and was a breakthrough in the negotiations, as it limited the
scope of responsibility to protect 5 by adding a restrictive element. 6
Furthermore, the four-crimes predicate limited the applicability of
responsibility to protect in international humanitarian law. Responsibility
to protect is only applicable in cases of genocide, as defined by the Gen-
ocide Convention of 1948, war crimes, crimes against humanity,89 and
85. Edward C. Luck, Sovereignty, Choice, and the Responsibility to Protect, 1 GLOBAL
RESP. TO PROTECT 10, 13 (2009).
86. See Nicholas J. Wheeler, A Victory for Common Humanity? The Responsibility to
Protect After the 2005 World Summit, J. INT'L L. & INT'L REL., Winter 2005, at 95, 102.
87. Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9,
1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277. The crime of genocide is defined by the Genocide Convention of 1948
as one or more of several listed criminal acts inflicted against a particular religious or ethnic
group with the intent to destroy "in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious
group." Id. art. 2. Article 3 establishes conspiracy, incitement, attempt, and complicity liability.
While under Article 8 "any contracting party may call upon the competent organs of the
[United Nations] to take such action under the Charter . . . for the prevention and suppression
of acts of genocide," the convention is primarily a criminal statute, focused on punishment of
genocidaires as opposed to preventing or stopping ongoing genocide.
88. War crimes more generally include conduct proscribed by the various treaties nego-
tiated in either The Hague or Geneva from 1864 to 1949 that form the core of international
humanitarian law (IHL), regulating the conduct of warring parties. See, e.g., Protocol for the
Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacterio-
logical Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 26 U.N.T.S. 571, 94 L.N.T.S. 65. The
International Law Commission's Nuremberg Principles set basic principles in the criminal
prosecution of international crimes, including war crimes. Principles of International Law
Recognized in the Charter of the Nirnberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal, with
Commentaries, [1950] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 374, 374-76, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/
1950/Add.1 (including the principles that all persons who violate intentional law are liable,
and that it is no defense if the accused were following orders or that their actions were legal in
their home country).
89. Crimes against humanity were first invoked in the Allied condemnation of the Ar-
menian Genocide during World War I. See Telegram from U.S. Dep't of State to U.S.
Embassy, Constantinople (May 29, 1915), available at http://0.tqn.com/d/middleeast/I/0/t/5/-
/-/telegram.jpg. The Allied Powers condemned the mass killing of Armenians as "crimes of
Turkey against humanity and civilization" and served warning "to the Sublime Porte that they
will hold personally responsible for those crimes all members of the Ottoman government ...
who are implicated." Id.
Crimes against humanity now include "widespread or systematic attack" against a civil-
ian population, not necessarily during a war. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,
art. 7(1), Jul. 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3. The International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia explained
It is by now a settled rule of customary international law that crimes against human-
ity do not require a connection to international armed conflict. Indeed, as the
Prosecutor points out, customary international law may not require a connection be-
tween crimes against humanity and any conflict at all. Thus, by requiring that
crimes against humanity be committed in either internal or international armed con-
flict, the Security Council may have defined the crime in Article 5 more narrowly
than necessary under customary international law.
Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94- 1-I, Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal
on Jurisdiction, 141 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995).
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ethnic cleansing."0 Thus, these four crimes present relatively well-defined
standards that states will be held to in terms of their protection responsi-
bilities, which should enhance the predictability in its application.
The Summit Outcome was hailed as a decisive break with absolute
sovereignty: "[N]o longer is it necessary to finesse the tensions between
sovereignty and human rights in the Charter; they can now be con-
fronted. Sovereignty no longer implies the license to kill."9' In
attempting to determine its legal status, Louise Arbour has suggested
that the Summit Outcome imposes an affirmative duty of care on the Se-
curity Council for persecuted populations, standing parallel to their
responsibility for international peace and security.92 Alica Bannon has
argued that the Summit Outcome is far more permissive, and may even
allow for unilateral action." Bannon reasons that the Sunmuit Outcome
can be equated with an endorsement of the ICISS view of sovereignty,
which includes a duty to protect.94 This idea, in conjunction with Articles
55 and 56 of the U.N. Charter establishing observance of "human rights
90. Ethnic cleansing was first used to describe the expulsion of civilians during the
Yugoslav war of the 1990s. The General Assembly condemned violence against Bosnian Mus-
lims, referring to "the abhorrent policy of 'ethnic cleansing', which is a form of genocide."
G.A. Res. 47/121, U.N. Doc. A/RES/47/121 (Dec. 18, 1992). However, the International Court
of Justice took pains to distinguish the two in The Bosnian Genocide Case, holding that
neither the intent, as a matter of policy, to render an area 'ethnically homogeneous',
nor the operations that may be carried out to implement such policy, can as such be
designated as genocide: the intent that characterizes genocide is 'to destroy, in
whole or in part' a particular group, and deportation or displacement of the mem-
bers of a group, even if effected by force, is not necessarily equivalent to
destruction of that group ....
Application of Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of Genocide (Bosn. &
Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), 2007 I.C.J. 108, 1 190 (Feb. 26). Thus, by the Court's reason-
ing, genocide is the destruction of a group and ethnic cleansing is the removal of that group.
There is both some redundancy and some controversy surrounding this term. Certain ac-
tions taken in the course of ethnic cleansing, i.e., mass expulsion of a certain population or the
use of widespread killing, intimidation, and rape are included under crimes against humanity.
As Professor Drazen Petrovic argues, the term ethnic cleansing also has somewhat dubious
roots; it was arguably invented to describe the actions of Bosnian Serbs to avoid the word
"genocide," which might have triggered an obligation under the Genocide Convention. See
Drazen Petrovic, Ethnic Cleansing-An Attempt at Methodology, 5 EUR. J. INT'L L. 342, 359
(1994).
91. Thakur & Weiss, supra note 3, at 23.
92. Louise Arbour, The Responsibility to Protect as a Duty of Care in International
Law and Practice, 34 REV. INT'L STUD. 445, 453 (2008).
93. Alicia L. Bannon, Comment, The Responsibility to Protect: The U.N. World Summit
and the Question of Unilateralism, 115 YALE L.J. 1157, 1162-63 (2005) (arguing that there is
a limited justification for unilateral action under responsibility to protect where the Security
Council is deadlocked); see also Stahn, supra note 72, at 109 (pointing out that paragraph 139
of the Summit Outcome does not explicitly preclude unilateral action).
94. Bannon, supra note 93, at 1161.
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and fundamental freedoms for all,"" would allow for a member state to
unilaterally intervene where the Security Council, and thus the U.N. as
an institution, has failed to address one of the four crimes. Bannon,
equating sovereignty with a defense that can be raised in the face of in-
terference, argues that "[i]f nations have no sovereign right to commit or
passively permit atrocities against their own populations, then they can-
not object on sovereignty grounds to coercive actions halting the
commission of those atrocities."
However, in many ways the Summit Outcome is a compromise doc-
ument without a decisive interpretation. Perhaps the 2005 Summit
Outcome strayed too far from the important and positive elements of the
ICISS Report by abandoning many of the prescriptive elements that
would have placed greater pressure on the Security Council to act (by
potentially limiting the veto, for example) while allowing too much
vagueness in the permissive aspect of responsibility to protect that may
open the door for abuse of the doctrine to justify interventions based on
self-interest, rather than concern for local populations." Additionally, the
Security Council has failed to act in the past due to a lack of political
will, and the Summit Outcome has been extensively criticized for not
providing a mechanism to escape the core political problems that plague
collective interventions."
95. U.N. Charterart. 55(c).
96. Bannon, supra note 93, at 1162.
97. Id.
98. See Bellamy, supra note 22, at 152-53; see also Bannon, supra note 93, at 1160
(noting that "the Summit Agreement does not address the structural issues that thwart effective
U.N. action to protect vulnerable populations").
99. See, e.g., Wheeler, supra note 86, at 103. The Summit Outcome was left so vague
by the negotiations that went into its drafting that "[tihe difficulty is that states can sign up to
the principle of the responsibility to protect but disagree over its application in particular cas-
es." Id. See also Bellamy, supra note 22, at 169, who adds:
It is imperative that states now return to some of the fundamental questions the
ICISS raised: Who, precisely, has a responsibility to protect? When is that responsi-
bility acquired? What does the responsibility to protect entail? And how do we
know when the responsibility to protect has been divested? If they do not, there is a
real danger that states of all stripes will co-opt the language of the responsibility to
protect to legitimate inaction and irresponsibility.
Id.
Rebecca Hamilton pointed out similar problems in her article, stating that "[tihere is
much 'in principle' support for the R2P from state actors, civil society, and, in recent months,
the U.N. as a whole. However, three key challenges threaten actual implementation: a lack of
political will, a lack of authorization, and a lack of operational capacity." Rebecca J. Hamilton,
The Responsibility to Protect: From Document to Doctrine-But What of Implementation?, 19
HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 289, 296 (2006).
Williams and Bellamy have documented the lack of political will in confronting the Dar-
fur crisis, pointing out that this is one of the major obstacles in implementing the
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B. The Secretary-General's Report on Implementation
of Responsibility to Protect
After the 2005 World Summit approved responsibility to protect
through the Summit Outcome, the U.N. secretariat began the process of
incorporating the Summit Outcome into policy. The new Ban Ki-moon
administration produced the 2009 report Implementing the Responsibility
to Protect: Report of the Secretary-General, which detailed the Secre-
tary-General's interpretation of responsibility to protect.( Calling
paragraphs 138 and 139 of the Summit Outcome "the authoritative
framework . . . [which] can seek to give a doctrinal, policy and institu-
tional life to the responsibility to protect,"'o' the Secretary-General's
Report lays out the policy implications of responsibility to protect based
on three pillars: (1) the protection responsibilities of the state, (2) inter-
national assistance and capacity-building, and (3) timely and decisive
response.102 In attempting to give more useful content to the Summit
Outcome language, the report drew on the pre-2005 lineage of docu-
ments that stretch back to the ICISS Report.0 o The Secretary-General's
Report largely reiterates that responsibility to protect first resides with the
state and outlines actions that can be taken at the state level to prevent ca-
tastrophe.'04 The report also covers assistance and capacity-building,
including an "active partnership"'o between the international community
and the state, which can include various measures from diplomatic
engagement to preventative deployment of peacekeepers."
Most notably, the Secretary-General's Report also calls for a "timely
and decisive" response in certain circumstances.'o Here the report-like
the ICISS threshold formulation-suggests a sliding scale, where "[t]he
more robust the response, the higher the standard for authorization."'a
The report cites the response to political violence in Kenya in 2008,
where there was energetic and early international involvement aimed at
halting domestic political violence despite no explicit authorization
from the Security Council, as an example of a "less robust" response
comprising political pressures.'09 Also echoing the ICISS Report, the
responsibility to protect. See Paul D. Williams & Alex J. Bellamy, The Responsibility to Pro-
tect and the Crisis in Darfur, 36 SECURITY DIALOGUE 27, 44 (2005).
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Secretary-General explicitly urged the five permanent members of the
Security Council to refrain from exercising the veto "in situations of
manifest failure" by a state to meet its obligation to protect its popula-
tion.no In calling for restraint in the use of a Security Council veto, the
Secretary-General's Report takes a slight step toward binding the Secu-
rity Council with a duty to act.
While the report took pains to establish its foundation in the Sum-
mit Outcome, a significant number of states did not vote to endorse it,
despite the fact they had endorsed the unanimously passed Summit
Outcome. One reason might be that the Secretary-General's Report
was more detailed and had more substance than the Summit Outcome.
While not at odds with the Summit Outcome's commitment to "take
collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security
Council, . . . on a case-by-case basis,""' the Secretary-General's Report
dials back the highly discretionary language of the Summit Outcome,
most significantly dropping the "case-by-case" basis language, and
adding the (non-binding) commitment to reign in the use of the veto.
Given the strong similarities between the ICISS Report and the Sec-
retary-General's Report, both rounds of debate focused on very similar
notions of what the doctrine meant. The first round produced the sub-
stantially less detailed Summit Outcome. The test in 2009 was whether
the member states would accept a more detailed articulation of the doc-
trine than was widely accepted in 2005.
III. THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY DEBATES
Responsibility to protect was debated twice in the General Assem-
bly. The first debate occurred during the plenary sessions leading up to
the World Summit which produced the 2005 World Summit Outcome,
cementing responsibility to protect, however briefly articulated, as the
position of the General Assembly's member states. The Secretary-
General's Report, which outlined a more detailed conception of the
doctrine more in line with the ICISS Report, was then debated in 2009
and was well-received by responsibility to protect advocates." 2 However,
the General Assembly simply "took note" of this report, unable to pass a
110. Id. 161.
111. Summit Outcome, supra note 2, 139.
112. See, e.g., "Implementing the Responsibility to Protect": Responding to the UN
Secretary-General's Report on the Responsibility to Protect Populations from Genocide, War
Crimes, Ethnic Cleansing and Crimes Against Humanity, GLOBAL CTR. FOR RESP. TO
PROTECT, 3 (June 2009), http://globalr2p.org/media/pdf/Responding-to-the_SGs_Report-on-
R2P-_June_16_Final.pdf.
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more substantive resolution indicating approval."' Thus, of the relevant
documents, we have the Summit Outcome, which is vague and highly
qualified but unanimously endorsed by the General Assembly and Secu-
rity Council, and the Secretary-General's Report, which is detailed but
has failed to produce a supporting resolution. While this is telling in it-
self, this Part will explore in more detail the statements of
representatives of the member states during the two debates.
A. Debating In Larger Freedom-The 2005 World Summit Debate
The 2005 World Summit was held to coincide with the Sixtieth Ses-
sion of the General Assembly, and it culminated in the largest gathering
of world leaders in history. In the plenary meetings leading up to the
Summit, the General Assembly was grappling with a broad range of is-
sues put forward by Secretary-General Kofi Annan in the In Larger
Freedom document, as part of what was the most ambitious attempt at
U.N. reform in its history. The most controversial and talked-about
agenda item at the time was Security Council reform. While many of
these efforts failed, responsibility to protect was discussed and incorpo-
rated into the Summit Outcome. Given the failure of much of the rest of
the Summit's agenda, this was the most notable achievement of the
Summit, made all the more impressive given the presence of so many
heads of state and government, whose presence lent greater symbolic
weight to the Summit Outcome.
While the debate was nominally about the ICISS framework, as ar-
ticulated by In Larger Freedom, floor statements tended toward
generality. Of the twenty-eight states that addressed responsibility to
protect in 2005, seven addressed the issue in neutral terms, twelve in
favorable terms, and seven in negative terms." 4 The strongest support
came from the European Union, which endorsed responsibility to pro-
tect."' Representatives who did not explicitly address responsibility to
protect, but simply associated themselves with the E.U. position, can
also be counted as supportive states."'6 These include the non-E.U. states
that were then candidates for E.U. membership, namely Turkey, Roma-
nia, and Bulgaria."7 It is also possible to consider E.U. states that
113. G.A. Res. 63/308, U.N. Doc. A/RES/63/308 (Oct. 7, 2009).
114. The verbatim records show the various positions taken in the debate at the summit.
See U.N. GAOR, 59th Sess., 85th plen. mtg. at 7, U.N. Doc. A/59/PV.85 (Apr. 6, 2005) (intro-
ducing the debates, which are contained in several different records compiled over several
days).
115. Id. at 10.
116. E.g., id. at 20.
117. The E.U. representative stated:
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remained completely silent during the plenary as being supportive of
responsibility to protect.
The E.U. position was presented by the representative from Luxem-
bourg, who stated:
The European Union endorses the concept of the "responsibility
to protect." Responsibility for security lies primarily with States,
but it also falls to the international community when a State fails
to protect its citizens. Flagrant human rights violations and acts
of genocide call for a strong response from and resolute action
by the international community."'
Neutral comments came from Argentina (speaking on behalf of the
Rio Group), Azerbaijan, Japan, Malawi (speaking for the African
Group), South Korea, Uganda, and Viet Nam. These comments can be
summarized as condemnations of mass atrocities with a very general call
to discuss responsibility to protect. These were essentially non-
committal on both the permissive and prescriptive elements but did not
call for greater restrictions. For example, Japan's representative stated:
Japan embraces the assessment of the Secretary-General that ...
the time is now upon us to look into the issue of "responsibility
to protect." However, even if military intervention as a last resort
cannot be completely excluded ... there are many instances in
which measures other than military means can and should be
exhausted by the international community to deal with a given
situation, and that will have to be further explored. We need to
re-emphasize here our concept of human security, to which I al-
luded before, that puts primary emphasis on the protection and
empowerment of individuals as a basic guiding principle to real-
izing prevention and the consolidation of peace in post-conflict
situations."'
The representative of Uganda stated:
I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union (EU). The acceding
countries Bulgaria and Romania, the candidate countries Turkey and Croatia and
the countries of the stabilization and association process and potential candidates
Albania, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Serbia and Montenegro
align themselves with this statement.
Id. at 7.
118. Id. at l0-l1.
119. U.N. GAOR, 59th Sess., 87th plen. mtg. at 29, U.N. Doc. A/59/PV.87 (Apr. 7,
2005).
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The notion of the "responsibility to protect" is welcome, but its
parameters should be well defined to avoid the temptation to in-
terfere in the internal affairs of States. It should be confined to
cases of genocide, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity,
and the prior authorization of the Security Council should be ob-
tained before there is such intervention to protect citizens.120
While the Rio Groupi2 l and Group of African States 22 were neutral, the
spokespersons for other caucuses, including the Group of Seventy-Seven
plus China and the NAM, did not address responsibility to protect.123
The representative of the United States did not mention responsibil-
ity to protect in his speech to the General Assembly.24 However, several
days prior, U.S. Ambassador John Bolton sent an open letter outlining
the position of the U.S. government that while there may exist a "moral
obligation" to act,
the Charter has never been interpreted as creating a legal obliga-
tion for Security Council members to support enforcement
action in various cases involving serious breaches of interna-
tional peace. Accordingly, we believe just as strongly that a
determination as to what particular measures to adopt in specific
cases cannot be predetermined in the abstract but should remain
a decision within the purview of the Security Council.125
Ambassador Bolton also suggested that states "should not preclude
the possibility of action absent authorization by the Security Council.
There may be cases that involve humanitarian castrophes [sic] but for
which there is also a legitimate basis for states to act in self-defense." 26
Bolton was the most outspoken critic of any prescriptive element to
120. U.N. GAOR, 59th Sess., 88th plen. mtg. at 8, U.N. Doc. A/59/PV.88 (Apr. 7, 2005).
121. The Rio Group, represented by the representative of Argentina, rather vaguely stat-
ed that "[s]pecial attention must always be devoted to preventing genocide or massive human
rights abuses. Such a debate should encompass a legal framework that conforms to the Charter
of the United Nations." Id. at 2.
122. The Group of African States took a more skeptical view, with the representative of
Malawi stating: "[I]t is important to point out the difficulty of defining collective security
solely in terms of the responsibility to protect. The protection of citizens should not be used as
a pretext to undermine the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of States." U.N.
GAOR, 85th plen. mtg. at 22, U.N. Doc. A/59/PV.85 (Apr. 6, 2005).
123. See id. at 13-15 (representative of Malaysia speaking for the Non-Aligned Move-
ment); id. at 16-17 (representative of Jamaica speaking for the Group of 77 plus China).
124. U.N. GAOR, 59th Sess., 87th plen. mtg. at 22-24, U.N. Doc. A/59/PV.87 (Apr. 7,
2005).
125. Letter from Ambassador John Bolton, Permanent Representative of the United
States of America to the United Nations (Aug. 30, 2005), available at http://www.
responsibilitytoprotect.org/files/USBoltonletterR2P_30Aug05%5B 1 %5D.pdf.
126. Id.
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responsibility to protect, which was reflected in the Summit Outcome's
"case-by-case basis" language, while also being an advocate for a per-
missive element that would allow unilateral intervention in the face of
Security Council inaction. 127
Negative reactions often touched on this very concern, that powerful
states such as the United States would act without Security Council ap-
proval, using responsibility to protect as a pretext. Nine states-Algeria,
Cuba, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Pakistan, Syria, Venezuela, and Viet
Nam-voiced opposition to responsibility to protect. These "strong sov-
ereignty" states all voiced similar suspicions regarding responsibility to
protect as being too permissive. The Egyptian representative stated:
[T]he "responsibility to protect," advocated in the report, could
become a threat to the principle of the national sovereignty of
States and could usher in a new era of intervention in the inter-
nal affairs of countries, particularly given that the legal
underpinnings of the theory remain unclear and that it relies on
an increasing division of responsibilities among the State, the in-
ternational community and the Security Council. The concept
has no legal or practical basis within the international commu-
nity.128
Other states explicitly linked responsibility to protect with humani-
tarian intervention. The Algerian representative stated:
[The responsibility to protect] is extremely difficult to distin-
guish from the idea of humanitarian intervention which the
countries of the South formally rejected .... In that regard, I
would point out that there is no legal basis in the Charter or in
international law for a right or duty to intervene.129
Cuba, Iran, and Venezuela were particularly blistering in their criti-
cism, arguing that it could be abused as a pretext for intervention and
displaying hostility towards the Security Council. Venezuela's delegate
argued that:
[T]his "responsibility," which is a pretext for interfering in the
internal affairs of States-the weak ones, of course-applying
double standards and concealing unmentionable motives, must,
according to the Secretary-General, be given to the Security
Council so that it can adopt coercive measures against the
127. Id.
128. U.N. GAOR, 59th Sess., 86th plen. mtg. at 13, U.N. Doc. A/59/PV.86 (Apr. 6,
2005).
129. Id. at 9.
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States-States of the South-which, on the basis of the views of
just a few, would be stigmatized as systematic violators of col-
lective human rights and punished through "humanitarian
intervention." 30
Iran's delegate stated: "There is a grave concern that the concept of
'responsibility to protect' could be invoked by certain countries to pursue
their own political agenda and that, through that idea, some parts of the
world may become potential theatres for their intervention."'.' This sen-
timent was also echoed by the Pakistani delegate: "The endorsement of
the so-called 'responsibility to protect' would steer the United Nations
along the same interventionist path. The big and powerful States, not
small and weaker ones, will decide where and when to intervene to pro-
tect people at risk."'32
Cuba associated responsibility to protect with the invasion of Iraq,
accusing the supporters of responsibility to protect of hypocrisy:
When the illegal war against Iraq broke out, some of the most
ardent defenders of the so-called "responsibility to protect" de-
cided to remain silent, while others allied themselves with the
attacker. As a result, hundreds of thousands of Iraqi civilians
died in a cruel attack. Nor did such defenders blink an eye when
we learned of the indescribable torture committed in the jails of
Iraq and Afghanistan and at the Guantinamo naval base. 3
Thus, opposition to responsibility to protect hinged on concerns that
it is indistinguishable from "humanitarian intervention" and thus an in-
excusable breach of "sovereignty" and Article 2(7) of the U.N. Charter.
Additional arguments included that it would be inconsistently applied or
that it would be biased and controlled by the global north.'-
The general picture that emerged from the 2005 discussion was of
most states taking a neutral stance toward responsibility to protect, with
supportive states outnumbering a small group of strongly opposed states.
130. U.N. GAOR, 59th Sess., 89th plen. mtg. at 24, U.N. Doc. A/59/PV.89 (Apr. 8,
2005).
131. U.N. GAOR, 59th Sess., 87th plen. mtg. at 18, U.N. Doc. A/59/PV.87 (Apr. 7,
2005).
132. U.N. GAOR, 59th Sess., 86th plen. mtg. at 5, U.N. Doc. A/59/PV.86 (Apr. 6, 2005).
133. U.N. GAOR, 59th Sess., 89th plen. mtg. at 15, U.N. Doc. A/59/PV.89 (Apr. 8,
2005).
134. See Mohammed Ayoob, Third World Perceptions on Humanitarian International
Intervention and International Administration, 10 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 99, 101 (2004).
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B. Debating the Secretary-General's Report-2009
The 2009 debates that considered the interpretation of the 2005
Summit Outcome in the Secretary-General's Report were much more
focused than the 2005 debate. Exactly three times as many representa-
tives spoke on the issue: ninety-three in 2009 compared to thirty-one in
2005, not counting the statements by the permanent observer missions of
Palestine and the Holy See."' While the debate centered on the imple-
mentation scheme of the Secretary-General's Report, as proposed by
Secretary-General Ki-moon, it also quickly became clear that serious
disagreements over the doctrine remained, and the discussion returned to
more basic definitional issues, especially as related to the responsibility
to react. Thus, from the 2009 debates, it is clear that support for respon-
sibility to protect has not significantly grown.
ICISS had attempted to sidestep the issue by declaring humanitarian
intervention a thing of the past. As ICISS Co-Chair Gareth Evans stated:
coercive military intervention, so far from being the heart and
soul of the doctrine-as was the case with "humanitarian inter-
vention"-should be considered only as an absolute last resort,
after a number of clearly defined criteria have been met, and the
approval of the Security Council has been obtained.'36
However well the ICISS Report places coercive intervention into a
broader context, still it re-emerged as the central point of contention in
2009.' As the representative from Pakistan candidly stated:
If members have not noticed, let me point out that everyone
agrees to pillars one and two. 31. ... Pillar three was introduced
10 or 15 years ago under another name-the right of interven-
tion. It is that and remains that. The Assembly voted vehemently
against it. . . . Pillar three is the right of intervention, no matter
how one looks at it or how one does not look at it.3 1
135. These numbers are derived from the transcripts of the meetings. U.N. GAOR, 59th
Sess., 89th-90th plen. mtgs., U.N. Docs. A/59/PV.85-90 (Apr. 6-8, 2005); U.N. GAOR, 63d
Sess., 96th-101st plen. mtgs., U.N. Docs. A/63/PV.96-101 (July 21-28, 2009).
136. Evans Comments, supra note 4, at 3.
137. See, e.g., U.N. GAOR, 63d Sess., 99th plen. mtg. at 22, U.N. Doc. A/63/PV.99 (July
24, 2009) (statement of Cuba, recalling humanitarian intervention and denouncing the respon-
sibility to protect); U.N. GAOR, 63d Sess., 98th plen. mtg. at 4, U.N. Doc. A/63/PV.98 (July
24, 2009) (statement of Pakistan, stating that part of the responsibility to protect is the "right
of intervention").
138. The Pakistani representative meant the protection responsibility of states, and inter-
national assistance and capacity building, respectively. See supra note 102 and accompanying
text.
139. U.N. GAOR, 63d Sess., 98th plen. mtg. at 4, U.N. Doc. A/63/PV.98 (July 24, 2009).
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There was near unanimous support for responsibility to protect as
diplomatic and development policy (in most cases, pillars one and two
from the Secretary-General's Report). States that supported the "timely
and decisive response" pillar of the Secretary-General's Report were
counted as having a positive opinion of responsibility to protect, while
those urging further discussion were neutral, and those that attacked the
doctrine were counted as negative.
Again the European Union supported the Secretary-General's Re-
port, and many E.U. counties rose and spoke in their national capacities.
Non-E.U. members Turkey, Croatia, Macedonia, Albania, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Montenegro, Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova, Armenia,
and Georgia aligned themselves with the E.U. statement. 140 The E.U. po-
sition echoed its position in 2005 and emphasized that "if a State is
manifestly failing to protect its populations, the international community
has a responsibility to help protect those populations and thereby also to
help maintain international peace and security."'41
The United States fully supported the Secretary-General's Report.142
The representative of Jamaica rose and spoke for the Caribbean
Community (CARICOM), and while the CARICOM position was not as
enthusiastic as the E.U.'s, it was generally positive and offered condi-
tional support for pillar three.14 The Jamaican representative emphasized
the prescriptive element and voiced the concern that the "Security Coun-
cil will refrain from the use of the veto and ... be stymied into inaction
in future cases where crimes of genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes
and crimes against humanity have occurred."'" He went on to propose
Security Council reform as the solution to these possible impasses.145
Several states seemed to address detractors by explicitly disassociat-
ing responsibility to protect from humanitarian intervention. The
representative of Mexico stated: "Unlike other concepts with which it is
associated, such as humanitarian intervention, the concept of the respon-
sibility to protect has a much sounder basis in international law, since it
was adopted by the General Assembly at the highest possible level and
140. U.N. GAOR, 63d Sess., 97th plen. mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. A/63/PV.97 (July 23, 2009).
141. Id. at 4.
142. Id. at 17.
143. U.N. GAOR, 63d Sess., 100th plen. mtg. at 6-7, U.N. Doc. A/63/PV.100 (July 28,
2009).
144. Id. at 7.
145. Id. The In Larger Freedom report argued that "[ilt is therefore of vital importance,
not only to the Organization but to the world, that the Council should be equipped to carry out
this responsibility and that its decisions should command worldwide respect." In Larger Free-
dom, supra note 70, 1 167. To accomplish this, the report urges reforms that would give the
Security Council greater geographic representation. Id. 1 170.
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endorsed by the Security Council."46 The representative of Morocco
stated: "A clear distinction has been established between the responsibil-
ity to protect and what is called the right to humanitarian intervention.
The responsibility to protect has also been limited to four categories of
crime: genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and wars against human-
ity."'47
The representative of Egypt spoke for the 115 members of the NAM:
Many elements of the Secretary-General's report have received
support .... Meanwhile, mixed feelings and thoughts on im-
plementing [responsibility to protect] persist. There are concerns
about the possible abuse of [responsibility to protect] by expand-
ing its application to situations that fall beyond the four areas
defined in the 2005 World Summit Outcome, and by misusing it
to legitimize unilateral coercive measures or intervention in the
internal affairs of States. There are also pertinent questions about
the role to be played by each of the principal organs of the Unit-
ed Nations within their respective institutional mandates and
responsibilities in that regard.148
The representative further stated: "The Secretary-General's report
offers some initial ideas on how to go about it and constitutes an impor-
tant input for the General Assembly to continue consideration of
[responsibility to protect] and its implications." 49 Three members of the
NAM explicitly endorsed the entirety of the Secretary-General's Report,
effectively going further than the common statement.'5 0
During the 2009 discussion a similar, but smaller group of states
than in 2005 rose in opposition to responsibility to protect. Cuba, Vene-
zuela, and Iran again expressed their opposition and were joined by
Bolivia, Ecuador, North Korea, and Sudan. Press accounts of the debates
over the summer suggested there was a well-organized opposition to re-
sponsibility to protect and the Secretary-General's Report led by the
President of the General Assembly and Nicaraguan diplomat Father Mi-
146. U.N. GAOR, 63d Sess., 99th plen. mtg. at 18, U.N. Doc. A/63/PV.99 (July 24,
2009).
147. U.N. GAOR, 63d Sess., 98th plen. mtg. at 13, U.N. Doc. A/63/PV.98 (July 24,
2009).
148. U.N. GAOR, 63d Sess., 97th plen. mtg. at 5-6, U.N. Doc. A/63/PV.97 (July 23,
2009) (statement of Egypt on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement).
149. Id. at 6.
150. See U.N. GAOR, 63d Sess., 100th plen. mtg. at 6, 21, 27, U.N. Doc. A/63/PV.100
(July 28, 2009) (statements of Jamaica, Swaziland, and Benin in support of the responsibility
to protect).
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guel d'Escoto Brockmann.'"' Father Brockmann opened the debate in the
General Assembly stating:
The problem for many nations, I believe, is that our system of
collective security is not yet sufficiently evolved to allow the
doctrine of responsibility to protect . . . to operate in the way its
proponents intend, in view of the prevailing lack of trust in de-
veloping countries when it comes to the use of force for
humanitarian reasons."l52
The sentiment that responsibility to protect is overly permissive,
which has been reflected by some academic commentators,"' reflects a
strong distrust of Western power generally and the Security Council in
particular. In fact, some commentators who are supportive of humanitar-
ian intervention have made just this sort of permissive argument-that
responsibility to protect could justify unilateral action-that so alarms
114people like Father Brockmann.
Ultimately, the only action the General Assembly would take was to
pass a neutral resolution on the Secretary-General's Report, which
"[took] note" of the report and committed the Assembly "to continue its
consideration of the responsibility to protect."'55 The original language of
the resolution was "[t]akes note with appreciation of the report of the
Secretary-General" but the words "with appreciation" were removed in
order to secure passage.' 6 Even given this weak language, the delegates
of Venezuela, Cuba, Syria, Sudan, Iran, Ecuador, and Nicaragua all rose
151. Father Brockmann had been involved with the Sandinista movement in Nicaragua
since the 1980s, having served as foreign minister during the Contra War. Brockmann organ-
ized an informal roundtable before the General Assembly debate, where such luminaries of the
left as Noam Chomsky and Jean Bricmont laid out an attack on responsibility to protect as a
pretext for Western imperialism and linking it to humanitarian intervention. Gareth Evans was
also on the panel and defended the doctrine. Brockmann's campaign is described in Responsi-
bility to Protect: An Idea Whose Time Has Come--and Gone?, ECONOMIST, July 25, 2009, at
58, available at http://www.economist.com/node/14087788?storyid=14087788&CFID=
157379714&CFTOKEN=87423715.
152. U.N. GAOR, 63d Sess., 97th plen. mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. A/63/PV.97 (July 23, 2009).
153. See Ayoob, supra note 134, at 101; De Waal, supra note 34, at 4 ("Let us be very
wary of developing any doctrine for humanitarian intervention. Any principle of intervention
can readily be abused-as by the French in central Africa-or become a charter for imperial
occupation."); Williams & Bellamy, supra note 99, at 36 (noting that the Iraq war has made
many states suspicious of humanitarian objectives in intervention).
154. Bannon, supra note 93, at 1162-63 (arguing that there is a limited justification for
unilateral action under responsibility to protect where the Security Council is deadlocked).
155. G.A. Res. 63/308, supra note 113, 1.
156. GLOBAL CTR. FOR RESP. TO PROTECT, GCR2P SUMMARY OF STATEMENTS ON
ADOPTION OF RESOLUTION RES A/63/L80 REv 1, at 1 (2009), http://globalr2p.org/media/pdf/
GCR2PSummaryofStatementsonAdoption ofLResolution onR2P.pdf.
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and either reiterated their opposition to the doctrine5 7 or emphasized that
the vote for the resolution was simply procedural and created no legal
obligations express or implied.
IV. THE LEGAL STATUS OF RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT-
NORMS, CONSENSUS, AND NEw RIGHTS OR DUTIES?
A. Question 1-Is a Norm Emerging?
TABLE 1: STATEMENTS OF GENERAL ASSEMBLY MEMBERS
2009 GA 7Floor Statements 27 60
RO/A
Gauging changing attitudes toward the doctrine between 2005 and
2009 will illustrate if responsibility to protect is gaining broader traction.
While the full unraveling of responsibility to protect as suggested by some
press reports in July 2009 did not occur and the 2005 Sunmit Outcome
language went unchanged, it is highly relevant that the Secretary-
General's Report was not endorsed and the General Assembly decided to
defer greater clarification of the doctrine. The disposition of state repre-
sentatives is also varied. Table 1 above presents the distribution of
statements in 2005 and 2009, as numbers and percentages of the whole.
157. See, e.g., U.N. GAOR, 63d Sess., 105th plen. mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. A/63/PV.105
(Sept. 14, 2009) (reiterating Venezuelan President Chavez's statements at the 2005 World
Summit).
158. Id. at 3-7.
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"Silent" E.U., NAM, Africa Group, or CARICOM members indicate
states whose representative did not rise and speak, but were associated
with a common position taken on behalf of all member states of that re-
spective organization.
It appears as if support for a detailed responsibility to protect doc-
trine has actually decreased. The difference in support may reflect a
general discontent with providing greater detail to the doctrine. The sev-
en states that so strongly oppose responsibility to protect largely
represent a small and somewhat peculiar group within the General As-
sembly. North Korea, Iran, and Sudan are, to varying degrees, pariahs for
their human rights records and belligerency.159 Venezuela and Cuba both
reflect a Cold War mentality, invoking anti-imperialist rhetoric and dem-
onstrating a deep distrust of the motives of Western countries.'" These
states exhibit a strong suspicion of Western power and the Security
Council as an institution, and thus reject responsibility to protect on the
assumption that it will be used as a pretext for imperialist intervention.
The elections of Evo Morales in Bolivia and Rafael Correa in Ecuador,
both left-wing politicians, between 2005 and 2009 may help explain the-
se states joining the opposition to responsibility to protect (as the
election of Barack Obama may explain the change in the U.S. position in
2009 from its position in 2005).
Far more relevant than these few opposing states are the members of
the NAM who are still cautious with regard to the concept. While in
2005, the NAM made no comment on the responsibility to protect, it did
in 2009 and its considerable numbers added to the "neutral" column re-
sulted in the positive and neutral camps being evenly divided. Despite
the reluctance on the part of the NAM to openly embrace the Secretary-
General's Report, the long-standing position of the group, as articulated
both in the Cartagena Statement in 2000 and the official statement in
2009, is not actually at odds with the Secretary-General's Report.
In the Cartagena Statement, the members of the NAM
reiterate[d their] firm condemnation of all unilateral military ac-
tions including those made without proper authorisation [sic]
from the United Nations Security Council or threats of military
action against the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independ-
ence of the members of the Movement which constitute acts of
159. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 2009 COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS
PRACTICES (2009), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/index.htm.
160. U.N. GAOR, 63d Sess., 99th plen. mtg. at 6, 21, U.N. Doc. A/63/PV.99 (July 24,
2009).
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aggression and blatant violations of the principle of non-
intervention and non-interference. 6 '
In 2009, the Egyptian representative, speaking on behalf of the
NAM, expressed the concern that an expansive application of responsi-
bility to protect would lead to abuse and interference. 162 The
representative concluded his statement with a tempered commitment to
end mass atrocity crime, invoking "respect for the sovereignty and terri-
torial integrity of States, non-interference in their internal affairs and
respect for fundamental human rights."6 1
These concerns seem misplaced. It is hard to imagine how responsi-
bility to protect could be construed to operate outside of the bounds of
the four crimes, but even so, it is the clear position of the Summit Out-
come and Secretary-General's Report that enforcement under
responsibility to protect must be done under the Security Council's
Chapter VII powers.
The NAM's position in the 2009 debates also showed more flexibil-
ity than its position in the Cartagena Statement, expressing support for
intervention carried out by the African Union under Article 4(h) of the
Constitutive Act of the African Union, which uses the same four crimes
language as the Summit Outcome.'6 ' Given its support for the right of the
African Union to intervene, the NAM cannot be making a purely strong
sovereignty argument. One is left wondering why exactly it did not fully
support the Secretary-General's Report, as it is hard to find any substan-
tive difference between the report and the Cartagena Statement.
The NAM statement also
expressed grave concern at instances wherein the Security
Council fails to address cases involving genocide, crimes against
humanity or war crimes... . [I]n such instances where the Secu-
rity Council has not fulfilled its primary responsibility for the
maintenance of international peace and security, the General As-
161. Cartagena Statement, supra note 43, 11.
162. U.N. GAOR, 63d Sess., 97th plen. mtg. at 5, U.N. Doc. A/63/PV.97 (July 23, 2009)
(statement of Egypt on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement). For language quoted from the
statement, see supra text accompanying note 148.
163. Id. at 6.
164. See Summit Outcome, supra note 2, 139; Secretary-General's Report, supra note
20, 11.
165. Constitutive Act of the African Union art. 4(h), July 11, 2002, 2158 U.N.T.S. 3
(providing for the "right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of
the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes
against humanity").
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sembly should take appropriate measures in accordance with the
Charter to address the issue.'"
Such concerns regarding past Security Council failures were the
original impetus for creating the doctrine in the first place. The idea that
the General Assembly could have a role in human rights enforcement
can also be traced to the original ICISS plan, which contemplated the
General Assembly's involvement via the Uniting for Peace resolution in
the case of a Security Council failure.67
Much of the impetus behind responsibility to protect was frustration
when the Security Council failed to act. Over thirty-five states echoed
the Secretary-General's Report's call that Security Council members
refrain from using the veto in situations where people are at risk of mass
atrocities. The Iranian representative argued in July 2009:
[T]here is no illusion that tragic cases of genocide, crimes
against humanity and outrageous acts of aggression have been
left unanswered not because of a lack of empowering legal
norms, but simply due to a lack of political will dictated by
power politics-that is, political and strategic considerations-
on the part of certain major Powers permanently seated in the
Security Council."9
166. U.N. GAOR, 63d Sess., 97th plen. mtg. at 6, U.N. Doc. A/63/PV.97 (July 23, 2009)
(statement of Egypt on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement).
167. ICISS REPORT, supra note 1, 6.7. The Uniting for Peace resolution would allow
the General Assembly to step in when the Security Council's permanent five members are
deadlocked, but there are sufficient votes to refer the matter to the General Assembly, which
could then recommend the use of force. The resolution states in part:
Recognizing in particular that such failure [of the Security Council to act] does not
deprive the General Assembly of its rights or relieve it of its responsibilities under
the Charter in regard to the maintenance of international peace and security ....
Resolves that if the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the perma-
nent members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of
international peace and security . . . the General Assembly shall consider the matter
immediately with a view to making appropriate recommendations to Members for
collective measures, including in the case of a breach of the peace or act of aggres-
sion the use of armed force when necessary, to maintain or restore international
peace and security.
Uniting for Peace, G.A. Res. 377A (V), U.N. Doc. AIRES/377A (V), at 10, (Nov. 3, 1950).
168. E.g., U.N. GAOR, 63d Sess., 98th plen. mtg. at 8, 17, U.N. Doc. A/63/PV.98 (July
24, 2009) (Singapore and South Africa); U.N. GAOR, 63d Sess., 97th plen. mtg. at 24, U.N.
Doc. A/63/PV.97 (July 23, 2009) (Costa Rica).
169. U.N. GAOR, 63rd Sess., 100th plen. mtg. at 11, U.N. Doc. A/63/PV.100 (July 28,
2009).
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Given that endorsement of the Secretary-General's Report represents an
additional commitment to act, supported by three of five permanent Se-
curity Council members (however weakly), it is less clear substantively
why Iran or the NAM is objecting.
The strongest possibility seems to be that, while those states object-
ing to the Secretary-General's Report may not have strong substantive
differences with the actual text of the report, they are unwilling to allow
such a detailed policy document to proceed as the "official" interpreta-
tion of the Summit Outcome. While the objections in 2009 may not be
entirely coherent in terms of the actual content of the Secretary-
General's Report, they may indicate a strong reluctance to allow the
doctrine to be better articulated and thus have greater utility as a doc-
trine. The underlying motive may be political, likely animated by a deep
distrust of the Security Council.
Ultimately, responsibility to protect has made little progress between
2005 and 2009, and the basic position of the NAM has not significantly
changed from the Cartagena Statement to the 2009 debates, with the
important exception of the endorsement of the African Union's "re-
gional" approach to responsibility to protect. While this position is not
significantly at odds with responsibility to protect generally, or the Sec-
retary-General's Report specifically, the failure of the General Assembly
to pass any substantive resolution other than calling for continued debate
indicates that the "norm" appears stalled, and should not be considered
emerging.
B. Question 2-Is There a Consensus Understanding
of Responsibility to Protect?
1. Basic Agreement
Even if there is no growing support for the doctrine, it is possible to
reach several strong conclusions about what states think the doctrine
means. Despite some rumblings that the General Assembly might actu-
ally retract paragraphs 138 and 139 of the Summit Outcome, the
170. International relations scholars have examined the formation of norms from a socio-
logical standpoint. Martha Finnnemore and Kathryn Sikkink have studied norm dynamics and
divide the adoption of a new norm into three stages: (1) norm emergence, (2) norm cascade,
and (3) internalization. By this scheme, norms emerge mostly through the actions of norm
entrepreneurs who spread the concept of the new norm and, through lobbying and advocacy,
bring it to the attention of decision makers. The second stage is norm cascade where, through
socialization and conformity, the idea of the norm is spread. The final stage is norm internali-
zation, where a norm has a taken-for-granted quality. Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink,
International Norm Dynamics and Political Change, 52 INT'L ORG. 887, 895 (1998). In the
case of the responsibility to protect, the norm probably has not yet reached stage two.
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majority of states in 2009 agreed that the Summit Outcome language on
responsibility to protect was final. Only Cuba, Sudan, and Venezuela
disagreed. 7 ' Benin, Costa Rica, Denmark, Liechtenstein, Lesotho, and
the E.U. all explicitly defined mass atrocities as threats to international
peace and security and thus under the clear purview of the Security
Council.17 2
The "softer" parts of the Secretary-General's Report dealing with
capacity and peace building appear to be completely uncontroversial. As
succinctly stated by Pakistan's delegate, "everyone agrees to pillars one
and two."'7 Most relevantly, this includes the pillar one formulation of
sovereignty as including a responsibility to protect. Thus the central con-
ceptual innovation of the ICISS Report in refraining sovereignty as
responsibility has been broadly accepted.
There is almost unanimous support for the idea of responsibility to
protect being based on the four enumerated crimes discussed above, with
many states echoing the language of the Secretary-General's Report that
the "scope should be kept narrow, [and] the response ought to be
deep." 74 Only France, in what seems like a reference to Myanmar's re-
sponse to Tropical Cyclone Nargis in 2008, expressed willingness to go
beyond the four crimes, stating that it would
remain vigilant to ensure that natural disasters, when combined
with deliberate inaction on the part of a Government that refuses
to provide assistance to its population in distress or to ask the in-
ternational community for aid, do not lead to human tragedies in
which the international community can only look on help-
lessly.'"
The refusal of other states to adopt this idea shows that it has little
support. Almost all states are willing to accept the basic formulation that
171. U.N. GAOR, 63d Sess., 101st plen. mtg. at 10, U.N. Doc. A/63/PV.101 (July 28,
2009) (Sudan); U.N. GAOR, 63d Sess., 99th plen. mtg. at 4-5, 21, U.N. Doc. A/63/PV.99
(July 24, 2009) (Venezuela and Cuba).
172. U.N. GAOR, 63d Sess., 101st plen. mtg. at 5, U.N. Doc. A/63/PV.101 (July 28,
2009) (Lesotho); U.N. GAOR, 63d Sess., 100th plen. mtg. at 54, U.N. Doc. A/63/PV.100 (July
28, 2009) (Benin); U.N. GAOR, 63d Sess., 97th plen. mtg. at 4, 21, 24, U.N. Doc. A/63/PV.97
(July 23, 2009) (Sweden speaking for the E.U., Liechtenstein, Costa Rica, and Denmark).
173. U.N. GAOR, 63d Sess., 98th plen. mtg. at 4, U.N. Doc. A/63/PV.98 (July 24, 2009).
174. Secretary-General's Report, supra note 20, at 8.
175. U.N. GAOR, 63d Sess., 97th plen. mtg. at 9, U.N. Doc. A/63/PV.97 (July 23, 2009).
It is interesting to note that this stance strongly comports with Professor Mario Bettati's writ-
ings where he has argued that humanitarian intervention includes free access to victims of
disasters. See Mario Bettati, The Right of Humanitarian Intervention or the Right of Free Ac-
cess to Victims, 49 REV. INT'L COMM'N JURISTs 1, 1 (1992). Professor Bettati has long been
associated with current French foreign minister Bernard Kouchner-the two co-authored a
book on humanitarian intervention. See supra note 26.
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there exists some responsibility to respond to mass atrocity crimes. For
example, even the Venezuelan representative said that "[s]uch crimes
must be condemned and prevented wherever they occur in the world."17 1
2. Right to Intervene-Is Responsibility to Protect Permissive?
The debates over responsibility to protect have generated consider-
able evidence of opinio juris on the issue of unilateral intervention,
almost all of which points to a lack of legal right on the part of individ-
ual states. The Summit Outcome language emphasizes the centrality of
the Security Council. Indeed, the "Pakistan proposal" discussed above,177
which limits responsibility to protect to the four crimes, suggests that
responsibility to protect actually narrows the possibility of an emerging
norm of unilateral intervention. The Secretary-General's Report also
rejects unilateralism: "[T]he responsibility to protect does not alter, in-
deed it reinforces, the legal obligations of the Member States to refrain
from the use of force except in conformity with the Charter."'7 ' Thus,
those scholars who have suggested such a right exists should consider
this stubborn resistance to the idea. Instead, despite the concerns of its
detractors, the debate on responsibility to protect may actually be closing
the door on the debate around unilateral humanitarian intervention.
3. A Duty to Intervene-Is Responsibility to Protect Prescriptive ?
There is still a lack of clarity and considerable suspicion about what
would trigger responsibility to protect. As the CARICOM statement
asked: "At what stage and under which circumstances will the Security
Council be authorized to take action under Chapter VII of the Charter,
including authorizing the use of force?"19 Pakistan and Switzerland ech-
oed these sentiments. 80 However tentatively the Secretary-General's
Report tried to push the doctrine in a prescriptive direction, it failed
largely because of the fear that it would simultaneously create a more
permissive doctrine as well. It still appears that the concerns of critics
who feel that responsibility to protect is not sufficiently prescriptive'
remain unanswered, as many member states have similar concerns, and
there is little consensus on what prescriptive force the doctrine now has.
176. U.N. GAOR, 63d Sess., 99th plen. mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. A/63/PV.99 (July 24, 2009).
177. See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
178. Secretary-General's Report, supra note 100, 13.
179. U.N. GAOR, 63d Sess., 100th plen. mtg. at 7, U.N. Doc. A/63/PV.100 (July 28,
2009) (statement of Jamaica on behalf of CARICOM).
180. U.N. GAOR, 63d Sess., 98th plen. mtg. at 2-5, U.N. Doc. A/63/PV.98 (July 24,
2009).
181. See supra notes 93-98 and accompanying text.
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A central theme that emerged from the 2009 debate is that, despite
four years "on the books" and some agreement, there is still a great deal
of incoherence about what exactly responsibility to protect means, espe-
cially in how it would shape the international community's response to
the next humanitarian crisis. The NAM's statement makes it clear that
many non-Western and developing states harbor serious reservations
about any legal development that increases the permissiveness of inter-
vention. This concern was clearly voiced in the roundtable held by
Father Brockmann before the 2009 debates and echoed in Mohammed
Ayoob's article Third World Perceptions on Humanitarian International
Intervention,182 as well as Alex de Waal's warning about the potential
abuse of responsibility to protect.'
C. Question 3-Has Responsibility to Protect Created
Any Legal Obligations?
Textually, the use of the word "responsibility" implies a prescriptive
element to the doctrine and a degree of duty on the international com-
munity to respond. However, positive answers to Questions 1 and 2 are
threshold questions to Question 3. There is still a fairly even split on the
basic support for the doctrine, as discussed in Part IV.A, and this split
seems motivated by a general disagreement on what the doctrine means,
as discussed in Part IV.B. Those areas of the doctrine for which there is
agreement and support, for example that it is applicable only when one
of the four crimes occurs, do not create new legal duties. The four-
crimes clause is simply a limitation on the scope of the doctrine and thus
has little legal force independent of the doctrine itself. Thus, the answer
to Question 3 must be no.
While there may be no new legal obligation, as past history has
shown, and as expressed by the member states during the responsibility
to protect debates, the next time there is a humanitarian crisis, all eyes
will fall on the Security Council to respond and responsibility to protect
will likely be a central part of the discourse. There is now a heavy accu-
mulated weight of opinio juris, both from opponents and advocates of
responsibility to protect, that the Security Council should act in cases of
mass atrocity crimes, despite the considerable degree of mistrust re-
vealed towards the Security Council.'84
While a few states touched on the lack of prescriptive force in the
doctrine during their 2005 and 2009 floor speeches, the debate largely
focused on the permissiveness of the doctrine. Thus the many academic
182. See Ayoob, supra note 134, at 101.
183. De Waal, supra note 34, at 4.
184. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 168.
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critics who worry about a positive obligation on the Security Council to
act, or even an agreement to not exercise a veto in the face of one of the
four crimes, will find little comfort in the outcome of the 2009 debates.
CONCLUSION
The inclusion of responsibility to protect in the Summit Outcome,
while an important new development, does not offer any significant way
out of the political problems that have plagued Security Council action
in the past.'"8 As Nicholas Wheeler persuasively argues, the Rwandan
Genocide would not have been prevented if responsibility to protect as
formulated in the Summit Outcome had been in place in 1994, as the
lack of political will after the Somalia debacle was simply too strong. 8
Ever present in this debate is also the dreary reality of global politics.
The last exchanges in the General Assembly during the 2009 debate con-
sisted of Russia and Georgia trading barbs over their recent war fought
in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, with each accusing the other of a litany of
human rights abuses and U.N. Charter violations.' Russia had invoked
responsibility to protect as a pretext for its invasion, realizing exactly the
fears of states worried about its abuse. The action was clearly taken out-
side the boundaries of legitimate action under responsibility to protect as
there was neither mention of the four crimes nor Security Council ap-
proval. Yet, while invocation of the doctrine in this case instilled no actual
international legitimacy, these sorts of actions undermine the legitimacy
of the doctrine and point toward lingering political problems within the
Security Council.
The long debate between human rights and nonintervention instilled
in the U.N. Charter has moved gradually toward the human rights direc-
tion, and perhaps this is the very slow crystallization of a new norm of
behavior. Indeed, the international community's intervention in Somalia
during the early 1990s under U.N. mandate may arguably have been in-
spired by a then inchoate sense of responsibility to protect and a hope
that, after the end of the Cold War, the instruments of international or-
ganization could be utilized to tackle the world's most difficult
problems. It is also a minor triumph that the ICISS definition of sover-
185. See Jutta Brunnde & Stephen Toope, Norms, Institutions and UN Reform: The Re-
sponsibility to Protect, J. INT'L L. & INT'L REL., Winter 2005, at 121, 121-22.
186. Wheeler, supra note 86, at 102-03.
187. U.N. GAOR, 63d Sess., 101st plen. mtg. at 21-22, U.N. Doc. A/63/PV.101 (July 28,
2009).
188. The Georgia-Russia Crisis and the Responsibility to Protect: Background Note,
GLOBAL CTR. FOR RESP. TO PROTECT, 1 (Aug. 19, 2008), http://www.globalr2p.org/pdf/
related/GeorgiaRussia.pdf.
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eignty as responsibility has been crystallized into general acceptance.
The responsibility to protect is therefore an important new political
commitment, perhaps akin to soft law, that the international community
will act the next time there are gross violations of human rights.
Michigan Journal of International Law
ANNEX 1: DOCUMENT TABLE
Responsibility first rests with the Responsibility to prevent Responsibility to react
8- state
ICISS REPORT, supra note 1, at ICISS REPORT, supra note 1, at
u) ICISS REPORT, supra note 1, at 19. 29.
g13.
Not addressed Not addressed 1) Seriousness of threat




5) Balance of consequences
0
A More Secure World, supra
note 3, at 13.
"This responsibility lies, first and "But if national authorities are
foremost, with each individual unable or unwilling to protect
State, whose primary raison their citizens, then the
d'tre and duty is to protect its responsibility shifts to the
population" international community to use
E diplomatic, humanitarian and
0 In Larger Freedom, supra note other methods to help protect
9 18,11135. civilian populations. WhenBusuch methods appear
insufficient, the Security Council
0o
may... take action under the
Charter of the United Nations,
including enforcement action
In Larger Freedom, supra note
18, 135.
"Each individual State has the 'The international community "We are prepared to take
responsibility to protect its should, as appropriate, collective action, in a timely and
populations from genocide, war encourage and help States to decisive manner, through the
a crimes, ethnic cleansing and exercise this responsibility and Security Council, in accordance
crimes against humanity. This support the United Nations in with the Charter... on a case-
responsibility entails the establishing an early warning by-case basis ... should
0 prevention of such crimes, capability. peaceful means be inadequate
E including their incitement, and national authorities are
E through appropriate and Summit Outcome, supra note 2, manifestly failing to protect their
hnecessary meanse r 138. populations
Summit Outcome, supra note 2, Summit Outcome, supra note 2,
138. 11139.
Pillar 1-responsibility to Pillar 2-assistance and Pillar 3-timely and decisive
protect first resides with state, capacity building to prevent response
Q" actions states should take to conflict
prevent conflict Secretary-General's Report,
Secretary-General's Report, supra note 20, at 22.
S) Secretary-Generars Report, supra note 20, at 15.
supra note 20, at 10. Summit Outcoe, supranot 2,maieslfiinortetthi
804 [Vol. 32:765
